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Abstract1 — Precise timing and precise location information 
are provided by Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) and 
play a crucial role in the positioning, navigation and data 
acquisition of most Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) and in 
various flight operations and tasks, e.g. time-stamping and geo-
referencing of data and images, return home, avoidance of 
obstacles and geo-fencing. Some of these critical operations have 
implications for the safety of the UAV, the surrounding 
environment and health and safety of people.  
Thus, it is important to ensure correct function of the 
navigation and the timing, under a wide variety of circumstances 
and in the presence of GNSS threats and GNSS signal denials. 
The performance of timing and navigation based on GPS/GNSS 
can be tested and verified in a controlled and repeatable way in 
the laboratory with different types of test equipment. We will 
introduce a wide range of potential threats to GNSS Positioning, 
navigation and timing and an overview of different test methods. 
In addition, we are presenting a method for time synchronization 
of drones to enable safe swarm and follow flights in UAVs. 
Keywords—GNSS simulation, interference monitoring, GNSS 
error effects, synchronization, precise timing  
I.  INTRODUCTION  
One of the major sources for precise timing and precise 
location information are the signals of Global Navigation 
Satellite Systems (GNSS). They also play a crucial role in the 
positioning, navigation and data acquisition of most Unmanned 
Aerial Vehicles (UAV), with many different applications in 
UAVs: time-stamping and geo-referencing of collected data 
and images, synchronization of swarm flying and follow-me 
flights, determination of position and attitude in-flight, flight 
trajectory by following a pre-defined number of waypoints, 
                                                          
1 Copyright © 2018 by ESS Journal 
mission planning, return home automatically without external 
control, avoidance of obstacles and geo-fencing [1,13].  
Some of these critical operations have implications for the 
safety of the UAV, the surrounding environment and health 
and safety of people, for example UAVs threatening to bring 
down aircrafts at airports, which are no-fly zones for UAVs. 
The appropriate GNSS based function to avoid this is geo-
fencing. Another example is obstacle avoidance to prevent 
collisions and damages for both the UAV and the obstacle, e.g. 
anything from a windowpane, tree, human being, to a power 
line.  
In order to ensure health and safety it is thus important to 
guarantee correct function of navigation and the timing, under 
a wide variety of circumstances, and in different signal 
environments. There can be signal disturbances, such as 
obscurations by buildings or reflected GNSS signals, called 
multipath. The performance of the timing and the navigation 
based on GPS/GNSS can be tested and verified in a controlled 
and repeatable way in the laboratory with different types of test 
equipment. We will give an introduction to and summary of a 
wide range of potential threats to GNSS positioning, navigation 
and timing, as described previously by ourselves and other 
authors, and test-setups for testing them in UAVs. The test set-
ups serve to illustrate state of the art GNSS test methods for 
UAVs. In addition, we, as timing experts, are proposing a 
method for time synchronization of UAVs to enable safe 
swarm and follow flights in UAVs. 
GNSS Vulnerabilities 
GPS/GNSS signals are vulnerable, because they ”arrive at 
the surface of the Earth with a very low signal power of -120 to 
-130 dBm, so low that it is usually buried inside the thermal 
noise. The GPS/GNSS signals are thus easy to interfere with by 
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other signals in the same band of moderate strengths, and 
vulnerable to different types of effects, including atmospheric 
disturbances, multipath and malicious spoofing. Other signals 
in the same band can be unintentional interference, jammers 
and spoofers.” [2a] 
Interfering radio signals in the L-band can be emitted and 
generated unintentionally, e.g. by defect devices or 
intermodulation effects of several RF transmitters, or different 
transmitter antennas installed on top of roofs of large sea 
vessels for a variety purposes, e.g. for mobile satellite  
communication and RADAR. 
Intentional interference is caused by jammers, which are 
devices designed with the purpose to disrupt GNSS signals. 
They produce stronger RF signals in the same RF band, and 
simply overwhelm the GPS receiver by sheer noise [3]. When a 
receiver is disrupted by a jammer, it is clear to the receiver and 
to the user that there is a signal problem. Jamming is not a 
highly selective process and can affect numerous unintended 
targets [11]. Several test campaigns in Europe in the last 2 
years suggest that the amount of jamming events has increased 
in recent years, e.g. by the widespread use of "privacy devices" 
generating intentional interference to GPS signals to prevent 
vehicle tracking, with a high density on highways [5,8].  
Spoofing on the other hand is a hidden attack misleading 
the receiver with erroneous information, to make it believe it 
has different position, velocity or time than it actually has. In 
this case, it is not clear to the receiver and the user, that there is 
a signal problem. Spoofing has been observed rarely so far, 
once f.i. at the Mexican US border for drug smuggling, but 
demonstrated to work in experimental field tests. [7] 
Multipath consists of reflections of the GNSS signals from 
metal or glass planes or smooth water surfaces, for instance 
reflections of GNSS signals on large sea vessels from the metal 
parts on board or from freight train iron parts on marshalling 
yards. In the case of multipath, the reflections are usually 
weaker and delayed with respect to the direct Line of Sight 
(LOS) signal.   
Atmospheric disturbances are caused by ions and particles 
in the ionosphere and troposphere and can delay, refract, 
attenuate and phase shift the GNSS RF signals, which will 
either affect the accuracy of the positioning and timing and/or 
the acquisition and tracking of the signals.  
All these effects can impair or deny GNSS based 
positioning, navigation and timing. Jamming and strong 
atmospheric disturbances cause lower carrier to noise ratio of 
tracked satellites and eventually loss of tracked satellites [5]. 
Multipath can lead to a decrease in accuracy of the position fix, 
as the receiver sometimes uses the reflected signals for the 
calculation instead of the line of sight ones. And the effect of 
spoofing are wrong position, navigation and timing results: a 
position or time deviating from the true one.” 
 “Jamming can be detected due to the strong power of the 
signals. Spoofing can be detected, because the spoofing signals 
differ from the real ones by” [2]      
• greater variation of signal strength, especially if the 
distance between the spoofer transmitter and the GNSS 
receiver changes a lot in the course of time as would be 
expected in a drone moving along its trajectory and a spoofer 
on a ground-based transmitter 
• spoofing signals result in more overall transmitted 
GNSS RF power 
• spoofing signals arrive from different angles than the 
RF signals of the GNSS satellites and all spoofed signals are 
arriving from only one direction, if sent by only one transmit 
antenna near the ground, in any case it would be close to 
impossible to mimic all the  different angles of GNSS satellites 
signals even with airborne spoofing vehicles. 
• All satellites are received twice – double signals  
• Difference between L1 and L2 
• Spoofed GNSS signals yield conflicting information 
with other on board sensors (if present) 
Thus spoofing and jamming signals can be detected with 
different detection algorithms [4], integrated into a receiver, or 
with special antenna arrays [12], capable of detecting the angle 
of arrivals of signals [13, 24], or with additional sensors 
integrated in the sensor hardware portfolio of the UAV. For 
other methods to mitigate jamming see [2, 4, 5]. 
In case of multipath, there are several signals for the same 
satellite, but in contrast to a spoofer, they arrive from various 
directions, they are weaker in signal power than the LOS 
signals and they contain exactly the same information in the 
navigation message as the other signals. During an in depth 
analysis with a Software Defined Receiver they can be 
distinguished.  
In addition, GNSS system errors have been observed 
several times in recent years. This means that the GPS or 
GLONASS satellites broadcasted erroneous information, such 
as a wrong UTC timing offset or a completely incorrect 
Almanac. In January 2016, there was a GPS anomaly during 
decommissioning of a GPS satellite, when several satellites 
transmitted an incorrect UTC timing offset, of -13.7 µsec [8], 
causing GPS timing receivers to output wrong timing 
information with the effect that a TV network in Europe 
stopped operation for several hours. [9].  
Another accident happened on 2nd April 2014: there was an 
incorrect upload of ephemerides to all GLONASS Satellites, 
equivalent to a complete loss of the GLONASS system for 
more than 10 hours. Only two weeks later, eight GLONASS 
satellites were malfunctioning for 30 min [10]. 
II. IMPORTANCE OF TESTING 
 In order to maintain correct navigation and timing, it 
is important that the receiver algorithm has functions to detect 
and cope with such events. These functions need to be tested to 
guarantee continued operation, even in case of external error 
sources. When improving software algorithms or installing 
other countermeasures, systems need to be retested to verify 
and quantify and the improvement.  
The easiest way is a live sky test with live GNSS signals 
outside buildings. Field-tests of UAVs and their GNSS 
navigation and flight control units are a good start for testing, 
but also time-consuming and expensive. In addition, all GNSS 
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signals vary a lot with time, as the GNSS satellites are moving 
fast in their orbits. They also vary with weather, 3 D Terrain 
and different disruptive factors, as described above. Thus, the 
tests under live-sky conditions can only convey part of the 
picture and do not allow for controlled and repeatable testing. 
Moreover, live sky tests are not possible in many special 
situations, e.g. in the case of geo-fencing. If a drone must not 
fly in the area of an airport, the test of the geo-fencing function 
cannot be carried out on-site, e.g. Frankfurt airport. One 
possibility for testing it is to artificially generate the respective 
signal environment consistent with the desired location and run 
the test elsewhere, preferably in a laboratory.   
More systematic testing can be performed in the laboratory 
repeatability and under controlled conditions, at different 
locations around the Earth, with different signals types and 
error effects and satellite constellations. In addition, a lot more 
tests can be run in the laboratory, than in the field. More tests 
improve the results and give a chance to fully assess the 
strengths and weaknesses of the GNSS navigation and flight 
control unit [15]. 
Testing in the lab can save a lot of time and will improve the 
overall reliability and functionality of the GNSS based 
navigation unit and answer questions like: Where is the best 
place for the antenna on the airframe? Can the vehicle still 
calculate its own position accurately, if flying at high latitudes, 
e.g. in Scandinavia, where there are fewer or no satellites 
overhead, “Can the UAV quickly regain its intended position if 
blown off course by the wind? Can the UAV recognize and 
compensate for multipath signals, reflected off water surfaces 
and tall buildings?” Does the UAV comply with public and 
legal regulations like altitude restrictions and no-fly zones? 
[14] 
III. TEST METHODS 
Many different test systems are available, e.g. interference 
detection and monitoring systems, GNSS RF signal generators, 
interference signal generators, and Record & Replay Systems 
for GNSS signals. 
Interference detection and monitoring systems [16], allow 
non-stop monitoring 24 h and 7 days a week of GNSS and 
interference signals on different L-bands and automatic 
detection and classification of interference. The severity of the 
interference events is analysed. The severity is the degree of 
degradation inflicted on GNSS reception and position 
accuracy. Moreover, snapshots of the jamming signals are 
stored and can be converted to test cases, which are later 
replayed in the laboratory, for systematic testing, by an 
interference simulator. 
A GNSS simulator generates realistic GPS/GNSS radio 
frequency signals (RF) designed to be as representative as 
possible of the signals that would actually be incident at the 
antenna of a GNSS receiver in the real world at any given time 
and date, with many different vehicle trajectories, obscuration 
environments, landscapes and buildings and different error 
effects, e.g. satellite orbit errors, strong attenuation of RF 
signals, or atmospheric effects [17]. 
Using an interference simulator allows to generate Radio 
Frequency Interference events with different waveforms, 
frequencies, duration and signal strengths. Both the GNSS 
signal environment and the interference can be combined and 
applied simultaneously to the Device under Test in order to 
check its ability to cope with the interference.  
A record and replay system samples the GNSS signal 
environment at L-Band and stores the down sampled, digitized 
GNSS signal internally at intermediate frequency (IF). Later 
the stored GNSS signals can be up converted again and be 
replayed in the laboratory with minimum loss. The advantage 
is that the complete and realistic GNSS signal environment is 
stored during a UAV test flight, including all multipath, 
interference and other error effects. Recordings can be replayed 
as many times as needed and thus provide full repeatability.  
IV. INTERFERENCE DETECTOR 
 
One example of an Interference detector is the Spirent 
GSS200D [16]: The DETECTOR constantly monitors the live 
GPS and Galileo RF signal environment at L1 at +/- 8 MHz 
around Centre Frequency (CF) and the GLONASS L1 RF 
signal environment at L1 at +/- 4.5 MHz, in a signal power 
range of -95 dBm to -25 dBm. An alternative model includes 
the GPS/Galileo L5 band at +/- 10 MHz, in a signal power 
range of -126.5 to – 38 dB. “It detects jamming events, 
classifies the impact of a jamming event, characterizes the 
waveform and type of interference, notifies the user via E-
Mail about serious events and stores snapshots of spectrum 
and spectrogram. The DETECTOR is a detector and an 
analyser, analysing the jamming signals frequency properties, 
signal strengths and potential impact on a GPS receiver. In 
addition, the snapshots can be converted into test cases for a 
GNSS and interference simulator system, enabling repeated 
and controlled testing of real jamming events in the 
laboratory.” [2, 5, 16] 
The access to the jamming event data is enabled via a web 
based service: all events are sent to a central webserver via 
internet, allowing the user to access an overview over all 
events listed in a table on a web portal. This can be either the 
Spirent web portal PT Cloud or a user specific private 
network. The web portal table allows viewing of the spectrum 
and spectrogram snapshots. The online table grants an easy 
access to the data and a fast impression about the amount and 
severity of jamming events at the test location of the active 
DETECTOR or even at several test locations, without a need 
for the user to manually sort and look through a huge amount 
of recorded data and without extensive computations. In 
addition to the online table there are analysis and visualization 
tools enabling monitoring over time and in-depth trend 
analysis [2, 16]. 
Data contain start time, date, ID (identification number), 
and duration of the event, signal type e.g. single tone or 
CDMA (Code Division Multiple Access), signal strength, and 
severity of the event. 
 “The detection function is accomplished using a fusion of 
complementary pre- and post-correlation techniques. The 
detection fusion algorithm is patented. Pre-correlation 
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algorithms make use of the digital signals at baseband or 
intermediate frequency (IF) which are available in the 
software receiver in the GSS200D. The post-correlation 
algorithms use measurements, which are typically available as 
outputs from a standard GNSS receiver, such as signal to noise 
rations (SNR), numbers of satellites tracked, automatic gain 
control (AGC) parameters and satellite geometry 
information.” [2] 
After the first level signal classification at the GSS200D 
Detector Probe hardware, the captured interference event is 
then transferred to the server for further characterization. 
The classification approach used assigns a threat level 
severity metric to the event. [16].  
 
This system allows to: 
• Monitor multi-frequency, on GPS and GALILEO L1 
and L5 (E5a), including all major Satellite Based 
Augmentation Systems SBAS (WAAS, EGNOS, 
MSAS, GAGAN, SDCM) [23] 
• Gather Quantified information on frequency, type 
and severity of RF interference threats 
• Automatic RFI event detections and alerts based on 
levels defined by the:  
o United Nations International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO) Annex 10 for GPS L1 
o The European Organisation for Civil 
Aviation Equipment (EUROCAE) Galileo 
MOPS for GPS L5 (or GALILEO E5a)  [23]  
• Enables correlation between observed performance 
issues and the threats that caused them  
• Confirm that a particular installation is contaminated/ 
uncontaminated by RF interference, raising an alert if 
there is a detected event.  
• Use collected data to derive a list of accurate 
resilience requirements  
• Differentiate non-intentional interference from 
jamming  
• Distinguish different jammers or identify multiple 
detections of the same jammers  
• Support the development of effective counter-
measures  
• Identify DME and TACAN signals  
• The ability to replay and resynthesize RFI: Used in 
conjunction with the interference generator GSS7725 
and the automatization software PT Test Bench, the 
detector can help with testing GNSS receiver, system 
or application performance. This enables informed 
decision making on mitigation and hardening 
strategies to improve robustness and integrity. “ [16] 
 
V. GNSS SIMULATORS 
Simulation has been a standard test method for testing 
GNSS (Global Navigation Satellite Systems) receivers for a 
long time. This test method is based on the artificial 
generation of realistic RF (radio frequency) signals on 
different signal channels as representative as possible of the 
signals that would normally arrive at the antenna of a GNSS 
receiver in the real world at any given time and date [17]. 
These signals are emulated with the correct frequency, 
modulation, Pseudo Random Noise (PRN) codes, navigation 
message and Doppler Effect. At the same time, they model 
vehicle and satellite motion, atmospheric and other effects, 
causing the receiver to actually navigate according to the 
parameters of the test scenario [17, 18, 19]. 
One of the major advantages of a simulator is that the user 
can freely chose location, time and date of the simulation, so 
that scenarios from all over the world can be tested without 
moving the receiver out of the lab. A signal generator offers 
full control over satellite signals, amount of satellites present, 
the health status of each satellite, error effects at the signal 
level and in the atmosphere [17, 18, 19]. Satellite signals can 
be switched on and off, and attenuated or amplified. Satellite 
clock and orbit errors can be introduced. Orbital deviations by 
application of an offset to the pseudorange, are especially 
suitable for Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring 
(RAIM) testing. 
Simulators can also provide correction data for GPS/GNSS 
pseudoranges, when higher accuracy than 2-15 m is required 
for positioning and geo-referencing in the cm range. A higher 
accuracy is necessary for survey grade-applications such as 
photogrammetry, dropping biological pest control (eggs of 
predators) or spraying fertilizers on agricultural fields. One 
such technique is Real Time Kinematic, where a mobile 
reference station transmits correction data to a rover receiver 
over the air. It is based on carrier-based ranging and provides 
ranges and positions that are much more precise than those 
available through code-based positioning [20]. Correction data 
are also provided by national CORS Networks (Continuously 
Operating Reference Station), with fixed stationary reference 
stations, which continuously monitor all GNSS satellites and 
gather integrity information and pseudorange corrections for 
their specific location. These data can lead to a significant 
improvement of the accuracy and integrity of the position 
fixes up to 200 km from the reference station. “Rovers 
determine their position using algorithms that incorporate 
ambiguity resolution and differential correction. Like DGNSS 
(Differential GNSS), the position accuracy achievable by the 
rover depends on, among other things, its distance from the 
base station (referred to as the “baseline”) and the accuracy of 
the differential corrections. Corrections are as accurate as the 
known location of the base station and the quality of the base 
station’s satellite observations. Site selection is important for 
minimizing environmental effects such as interference and 
multipath, as is the quality of the base station and rover 
receivers and antennas.” [Citation from Novatel, 20]. RTK is a 
method for real-time correction. There are also methods for 
post-processing data to achieve the high accuracy, if it is not 
needed in the field, such as Post processed Kinematic, 
allowing for more convenient calculation in the lab.  
Another source of correction data are broadcasts from 
special geostationary satellites. These systems are called 
Satellite Based Augmentation Systems (SBAS), some provide 
data in the public domain free of charge [e.g. EGNOS the 
European Geostationary Overlay Service] [24], others are 
commercial systems, e.g. Starfire [25]. 
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High quality simulators are capable of generating several 
different types of correction data as provided by publically 
available SBAS, CORS and RTK stations in the correct format 
consistent with the GNSS signal environment and simulated 
location of the device under test. Here we show different 
possibilities of test-setups for a drone navigation unit with a 
simulator, depending on the accuracy level required.  
For testing normal accuracy levels of 2-15 m, the 
uncorrected GPS/GNSS RF signals from the simulator are 
sufficient as shown in the left side of figure 1. This test only 
requires one set of signals via one RF output. Initially the 
GNSS RF signals from a high quality simulator are “too good” 
to be true. They are very pure and accurate and do not reflect 
the live sky conditions. Thus, the Device Under Test will 
usually show better results with a simulator than outside in the 
real world. In order to be more realistic, atmospheric delays, 
disturbances, and antenna patterns need to be introduced, and 
further environmental effects. 
 
 
 
 
 
In PPK, the correction data are not immediately applied to 
the position, navigation and timing fix, but later after the 
return of the UAV. With this method, it is sufficient to log the 
RTCM correction data during the simulation and apply them 
later to the acquired pseudo-ranges and positions.  
A second possibility to output the correction data of the 
reference station is by antenna over the air via second RF 
Output to be retransmitted. In this case, amplification of the 
RF signals is required, because the RF signals are strongly 
attenuated by the air near the antenna.  
For a simulation with two UAV`s, which need to be aware 
of their relative position to each other, a GNSS signals 
simulator can output the correct signal environment via two 
RF outputs. The signal environment is slightly different for 
each of the UAVs, and thus needs to be generated separately 
and specifically for each of the two flying aerial vehicles, 
according their specific location, trajectory and vehicle 
dynamics.  
With a GNSS signal simulator there is also the possibility 
for a HIL, Hardware in the loop, simulation (figure 2). A UAV 
trajectory simulator can calculate and modify the trajectory in 
real-time during the simulation run, feed the new positions to 
the simulator, which converts it into corresponding, coherent 
GNSS signals and transmits them to the Navigation Unit of 
the UAV, which in turn feeds back its calculated position to 
the UAV trajectory simulator. The UAV simulator is very 
similar to standard flight simulators.   
VI. INTERFERENCE GENERATORS 
Interference signal generators emulate jamming and 
interference signals. The purchase and operation of GPS 
/GNSS jammers is illegal in many different countries. 
However, it is possible to legally generate interference signals 
with an interference generator, e.g. a vector signal generator. It 
allow the user to directly inject the interference signals into 
the Device under test via cable and avoid the RF entering the 
surrounding environment. The interference generator can be 
combined with a GNSS signal generator and controlled by one 
software and its Graphical User Interface. This enables 
controlled simulation of both signal types together: the 
desirable GNSS signals and the undesirable interference 
signals, adding the possibility to modify the interference 
signals, set and modify the onset and end, signal strength and 
waveform. The interference signal can be attenuated or 
amplified step wise to allow for systematic sensitivity tests.  
One such system is the Spirent GSS7725 Interference 
Generator, which allows the playback of real detected events 
or custom RF Interference Sources. “Interference signals can 
be generated from I/Q data files provided from real detected 
events, such as from a Spirent Detector [21]. The interference 
generator is controlled via Ethernet with a host controller 
which, when combined with a Spirent Simulator … allows 
seamless control of both GNSS and interference signals to be 
combined and generated …. The interference signals are in the 
form of canned I/Q files converted to RF interference signals 
with a 3 dB bandwidth up to 25 MHz A selection of these 
signals are available from predefined test scenarios for GNSS 
vulnerabilities and threats.” Moreover, specific I/Q files can 
be generated.  The interference source follows the trajectory of 
the simulated vehicle” [21, 22]. 
VII. RECORD AND REPLAY SYSTEMS 
In recent years, Record and Replay of GNSS signals has 
been established as an alternative method to simulation, with 
signals being received and captured in a static or dynamic 
measurement like a test drive, then converted to IF and stored 
on a hard disk, and later replayed in the lab after up-
conversion from the IF back to the RF signals. [17]. 
 
Figure 1: Test Setups with a GNSS simulator [1] 
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The advantages are that the recordings can fully capture 
real signal environments with complex errors including 
obscuration and multiple reflections, called multipath. 
Multiple test drives or flights at difficult locations, with a 
known GPS/GNSS reception problem, can be captured and 
used for tests, with no need to revisit the real location. The 
replay tests are fully repeatable, as the same signal 
environment is reproduced during each replay, at the same 
time and date [26]. 
On the other hand, there is virtually no control over the 
signals and the error conditions in the recording, except that 
some attenuation can be applied. Contrary to GNSS simu-
lators, time and date of the test flight cannot be changed, nor 
the amount of satellite signals present in the recording, nor the 
signal parameters and the navigation message. 
For every new location or date, a new test recording is 
required. The recorded error conditions captured in the 
recording are usually unknown, unless the user has additional 
information about special conditions from external sources, 
like space weather reports. Test drives and recordings are easy 
and cost effective for stationary receivers and land vehicle 
based receiver, and possible for UAVs, and allow Software 
and Hardware testing including system trials, algorithm 
studies and iterative algorithm development, interference and 
jamming recording and monitoring. Tests are possible on 
UAVs capable of carrying a payload of 2.2 kg or more. See 
test-setup in figure 2. 
One example of a record and replay system is the Spirent 
GSS6450. The record replay system GSS6450 is a portable 
unit with a weight of 2.2 kg. It is capable of recording 4 GNSS 
bands simultaneously at all L-band frequencies, including 
IRNSS (Indian Regional Navigation Satellite System), SBAS, 
Inmarsat based correction services, QZSS (Quasi Zenith 
Satellite System), B3, and Galileo E6, in short it will record all 
major GNSS bands via 1 RF input port. The latest version of 
the GSS6450 is capable of recording signals in the GNSS, 
WIFI and LTE band, simultaneously, via three RF input ports. 
During recording, the RF signals, are down converted, 
digitized and stored at IF and can later be faithfully replayed 
with minor losses of 1-2 dB. During playback, the IF signal is 
recreated and then up-converted to RF at the relevant GNSS 
frequency using the same built-in oven controlled local 
oscillator (OCXO) as used to record the data for minimum 
phase noise.” [6]. RF signals can be recorded at 4, 8 or 16 bit 
for quantization and at 10, 30, 50, 60 MHz and 80 MHz  
bandwidth. There are throughput limitations at 8 and 16 bits 
and at 50, 60 and 80 MHz bandwidth, limiting the amount of 
channels that can be recorded simultaneously to 1-2. [6]. The 
GSS6450 contains an OCXO for record and playback for high 
frequency stability [2]. The advantages of a higher bit depth, 
e.g. 16 bit, are a reduction of loss in C/No during quantization 
and a higher dynamic range of signals recorded. 
In addition the RPS GSS6450 contains an L1 only 
GPS/GNSS receiver, integrated together with an internal 
LINUX controller, allowing to cross check visible satellites 
and carrier to noise levels. NMEA data from the internal 
GNSS receiver can be stored to file [6]. Additional Recording 
of external data, such as CAN bus data and IMU data, is 
possible via serial ports and data is stored inside the GNSS 
file, so that it can be replayed synchronously. Up to eight 
synchronous inputs can be stored. Recording of four different 
video streams parallel to GNSS signals is also possible, and 
the video signals can be replayed within 0.5 sec of the GNSS 
signals. 
In figure 2, a test setup for UAV applications can be seen: a 
UAV trajectory and GNSS signal environment can either be 
recorded by simulating them with a GNSS signal simulator 
and injecting the RF into the RF Input Port of the Record and 
Replay System, or a UAV carries the Record and Replay 
System as a payload, due to the low weight of the GSS6450 of 
2.2 kg. In this case, the GPS/GNSS signal environment is 
recorded in flight along the UAV’s trajectory. 
If differential corrections are needed, a stationary Record 
and Replay system (RPS) can serve as a reference station 
together with a geodetic GNSS receiver. The Record and 
Replay system records the GNSS signals on the ground, while 
the geodetic GNSS receiver calculates the corrections, which 
are then transmitted to the device under test [20]. In RTK tests 
with a previous model with two stationary RPS and a baseline 
of 2 km, the accuracy of positions was less than 8 mm 
difference to the truth-value in latitude and longitude and 
about 13 mm in height. [20]. 
 
 
 
VIII. USE CASES  
 
Simulators and RPS (Record and Replay):   
A Chinese manufacturer of commercial UAVs for precision 
aerial surveying, wanted to test the performance of their UAV 
 
Figure 2: Record and Replay System and HIL [14]  
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GNSS receivers. Using a high-end research and development 
R&D simulator, they were able to model a wide range of real-
world conditions. 
The particular focus was on how well the receiver would 
cope with high winds, multipath effects, atmospheric 
interference, signal obscuration, and the vibration and tilting 
of the UAV in flight. The high-end research and development 
simulator was able to simulate all of these conditions to 
characterise the performance of the receiver. In addition, this 
company is also using a Record and Replay System to record 
and replay live test flight data in the lab, greatly reducing the 
amount of additional test flights. [14]  
 
Simulator and Engineering Test Services:  
A US company wanted to apply for an FAA certification 
for their UAVs and asked for help with conversion of DO 229 
test cases into simulator scenarios, to prove that their UAV 
GNSS receiver could be compliant to the aviation MOPS 
(Minimum Operational Performance Standard) in aviation 
standard DO-229. Simulator tests were used to help them 
prove air-trustworthiness of their UAV GNSS system. 
Simulator scenario generation and testing of the GNSS 
receiver part were outsourced to experienced test engineers 
and carried out with a combination of a GPS/GNSS simulator 
and interference simulator as described above.  
 
Tests included are: 
 
Scenario     Constel-
lations      
Interfe-
rence       
Description 
 
1 GPS + 
SBAS   
No Received messages can be 
decoded properly. Calcu-
late the loss rate of 
messages over 6 hours. 
2 GPS No Detect an error in the root 
square semi-major axis 
(A1/2) parameter of the 
ephemeris transmitted by a 
satellite.  
3 GPS No Introduce a pseudorange 
step error (m) in a satellite 
signal. Check that the 
receiver can exclude 
quickly the satellite from 
the navigation solution. 
4 GPS No Similar to above, for a 
pseudorange ramp error 
(m/s), then check that the 
receiver can exclude 
quickly the satellite from 
the navigation solution. 
Scenario     Constel-
lations      
Interfe-
rence       
Description 
 
5 GPS Yes Valid Horizontal Protection 
Level (HPL) and position 
error within a certain 
threshold under the pre-
sence of interference for a 
moving receiver. 
6 GPS  No How quickly the receiver 
can re-acquire the signal of 
a satellite. 
7 GPS + 
SBAS 
No How quickly the receiver 
can re-acquire the signal of 
an SBAS satellite. 
8 GPS Yes Ability to exclude a 
satellite with high Interfe-
rence-to-Signal Power (I/S) 
ratio 
9 GPS + 
SBAS 
Yes Ability to maintain robust 
pseudorange measurements 
under interference condi-
tions (at various frequency 
test points). 
 
 
Table 1  DO 229 Example test cases [personal 
communication, Kimon Voutsis, Spirent] 
 
 
Interference monitoring:  
DETECTORs cannot be used directly for testing 
interference. They are mainly used to monitor the signal 
environments continually for longer periods. Such monitoring 
field measurements have been performed in many locations 
around Europe. One 2 week field test near a German 
Autobahn and near a small airport demonstrated 238 
interference events, spread out quite evenly over the 2 weeks, 
with 34 high priority events [5], having a strong impact on 
C/No of GNSS signals and numbers of tracked satellites in a 
professional GNSS receiver installed at the same site. [5]. 
DETECTORs can contribute to testing interference, 
because they acquire signal snapshots, as spectrum and 
spectrogram, which can be converted into test files, to be 
replayed by a professional interference signal generator (see 
above), enabling laboratory testing of real life interference 
events. In this way, more realistic, repeatable testing of real 
jamming threats becomes possible. 
 
IX. TIMING AND SYNCHRONIZATION IN A UAV SWARM 
UAVs flying in a swarm are used for strategic and highly 
professional operations. They need to be steered in 
synchronized action, so that they do not collide with each 
other and external structures, thus they need to be 
synchronized in time and space. In order to synchronize UAVs 
flying in a swarm, all UAVs need be on the same time-scale 
with a high accuracy of timing information. One way to do 
this is, when all members of the swarm are equipped with the 
same type of GPS/GNSS receiver, and with a high quality 
oscillator (e.g. Oven Controlled Oscillator OCXO) with a drift 
of 0.002 ns/s or with a slightly less stable more lightweight 
TCXO (Temperature Controlled Oscillator) with a drift of 200 
ns/s. In addition, the UAVs need at least one communication 
link to a central server and communication station, which 
K.Hünerbein, W. Lange  ESS (Vol 5. No 1. 2018) (pp.17-25) 
~ 24 ~ 
 
monitors and controls their movements, via telemetry 
commands.  
Almost all professional UAVs are equipped with a 
GPS/GNSS receiver, integrated into their on-board flight 
control system. The receivers are able to calculate a time with 
very good accuracy from the GNSS signals: standard receivers 
achieve a normal timing accuracy in the range of about 100 ns, 
resulting from a calculation of a position and timing fix (PNT 
fix), which does not drift. In order to synchronize the drones in 
a swarm, it is sufficient to transmit the resulting times of each 
UAV to a central processing server and record the messages. 
The normal timing accuracy of a GPS/GNSS receiver is in the 
range of about 100 ns. However, the computer chips with a 
LINUX operating system embedded in the navigation and 
control unit only support timing accuracies of 100 – 200 µsec. 
Thus, the accuracy available by the GPS/GNSS receiver 
cannot be fully used. A drone flying at 10-20 m/sec (36-72 
km/h), would move only 0.02 mm in 1000 ns, and will move 
only 2-4 mm in 100-200 µsec. If the position of all drones in a 
swarm is known at the beginning of the swarm flight, with a 
sufficient accuracy of a few cm, the small timing differences 
of GPS/GNSS time cannot cause any major conflicts in their 
flight trajectories. 
The OCXOs (or TCXOs) of all drones will be synchronized 
by the GPS/GNSS time at the initial phase of the flight, and 
serve as a backup in case of lack of GPS/GNSS signals. This 
process takes about 4 minutes. After a synchronization phase, 
the OCXOs (or TCXOs) are independent of the GPS/GNSS 
time and thus able to provide precise timing on their own for 
several minutes, even if GPS/GNSS fails due to errors and 
vulnerabilities (see above). Whenever GPS/GNSS signals are 
available, the precise time from the PNT fix will serve as 
correction for the OCXO, at regular intervals throughout the 
flight of the UAV, and thus maintain precise time in each 
UAV.  
In this way, synchronization of UAV timing and position is 
achieved in a first step and synchronization is maintained 
during the flight. In a second step, control of their joint actions 
is managed by the central control server, which will send 
manoeuvre control commands tagged with a timestamp to 
ensure that the commands are carried out simultaneously by 
all UAVs in the swarm. The manoeuvre control commands 
could also be sent out to take immediate effect, provided that 
the swarm members are flying close by each other within  
500 m, else there will be a propagation delay of the 
transmitted command signals, causing a certain offset in the 
arrival at the UAVs command receiver, also causing lack of 
synchronization in the motion, if uncompensated for. As all 
the positions of all the UAVs are available and known at the 
central control server, an offset can be included in the 
timestamp of the action and manoeuvre commands to 
compensate the propagation delay due to different distances of 
the UAVs to the  control centre. 
The greatest problem for the swarm could occur in case of 
loss of communication path to the central server. In this case 
the UAV’s should have an on-board program with a 
predefined security manoeuvre, e.g. a “return to home” 
trajectory, enabling each member of the swarm returning to its 
initial homing position. 
In order to implement the synchronization functionality, 
normal COTS timing systems and standard timing GNSS 
receivers are fully adequate. We assume that drones for 
swarms will be used for professional applications, e.g. 
surveillance of an area and have a sufficient size to be able to 
easily carry both the additional OCXO (weight about 8 g) or 
TCXO (with a weight of 1-2 g), and the Telemetry and 
command unit, receiving the commands from the central 
control server. The precision of this timing solution, 
GPS/GNSS time, which does not drift, combined with a local 
OCXO, which does drift, but is always available, is far better 
than the level necessary for navigation and manoeuvre control. 
At the same time, this timing precision is a great advantage for 
data acquisition and data transmission.  
X. CONCLUSION 
 
As GNSS positioning, navigation and timing are crucial for 
most UAVs in flight and for many different UAV 
applications, it is important to test the performance of GNSS 
based flight controllers of UAVs. 
In this paper, we give an overview of different types of 
GNSS errors and vulnerabilities, such as interference, 
spoofing, multipath and GNSS system errors. We also 
introduce different methods to monitor and generate 
interference signals, and emulate or replay complete GNSS 
signal environments including diverse errors and interferences 
with high fidelity and close to reality. These emulated or 
replayed signals can be used in the laboratory for controlled 
and repeatable testing. Different test setups are possible, and 
have been used manifold in real-life field tests and laboratory 
tests. We present three examples of such field and laboratory 
test campaigns. In addition, we introduce a method to combine 
GNSS timing results with an OCXO (TCXO) for precise 
synchronization of timing and motion in a swarm of UAVs.   
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